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COMMENT
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - GUILTY PLEAS - Voluntariness Where
Motivated by Desire to Escape Death Penalty Under Unconstitutional
Statutory Scheme. -Brady
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970);
Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).

E

ARLY in 1959 Robert Brady was indicted in federal court for kidnapping and for failing to release the victim unharmed in violation
of the Federal Kidnapping Act.1 He faced a maximum penalty of death
if the verdict of the jury should so recommend.2 After his codefendant
had confessed and on advice of counsel, Brady entered a plea of guilty.
The plea was accepted, but only after the trial judge had twice questioned Brady concerning its voluntariness.3 Brady was sentenced to 50
years (later reduced to 30 years) imprisonment.
Five years after Brady's conviction, 15 year old Charles Lee Parker
was arrested in Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina, for suspicion of burglary. After being questioned, he was placed in a jail cell where he spent
the night. The following morning after a short period of questioning,
Parker confessed to burglary and rape. He was subsequently indicted
for first degree burglary, an offense which carries a mandatory death
sentence4 unless the defendant pleads guilty or the jury recommends
mercy.5 On advice of counsel Parker pled guilty; and, following a series
of questions by the trial judge as to its voluntariness, 6 the plea was
7
accepted. Parker was thereupon sentenced to life imprisonment.
1

1 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (1) (1964).
Id. § 1201 (a)(1) to (2) (1964), provides that:
(a) Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce,
any person who has been unlawfully seized, confined, inveigled, decoyed, kidnapped, abducted, or carried away and held for ransom or reward or otherwise,
except, in the case of a minor, by a parent thereof, shall be punished (1) by
death if the kidnapped person has not been liberated unharmed, and if the
verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any term
of years or for life, if the death penalty is not imposed.
3 For a verbatim account of the exchange between Brady and the trial judge, see 397 U.S. at
743-44 n.2.
4
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-52 (1969).
5 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-162.1 (1965):
In the event [a guilty] plea is accepted, the tender and acceptance thereof shall
have the effect of a jury verdict of guilty of the crime charged with recommendation by the jury in open court that the punishment shall be imprisonment
for life in the State's prison; and thereupon, the court shall pronounce judgement that the defendant be imprisoned for life in the State's prison.
6 For a verbatim account of the exchange see Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. at 793
2

7

n.3 (1970).

1d. at 793.
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In 1968, doubt was cast on the validity of the guilty pleas of Brady
and Parker by the decision in the case of United States v. Jackson,8 in
which the Supreme Court invalidated the death penalty provision of
the Federal Kidnapping Act on the ground that it imposed an impermissible burden upon the exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to
trial by jury and the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty. The
precise infirmity of the statutory provision considered in Jackson was
that it immunized from the death sentence those willing to enter a guilty
plea and, therefore, "needlessly" encouraged guilty pleas and jury
waivers.9 Relying on only the implications of Jackson,'0 Brady and
Parker filed petitions in their respective forums seeking post-conviction
relief on the ground that their guilty pleas were motivated by a desire
to escape the death penalty, a motivation supplied by an impermissible,
unconstitutional statutory scheme. 1 Both petitions were denied, Brady's
by the lower federal courts12 and Parker's by the North Carolina state
courts.' 3 On review, the Supreme Court held that neither the record in
Brady nor in Parker revealed any basis for disturbing the judgments of
the respective courts below, i.e., that the petitioners' guilty pleas were
4
tendered voluntarily and knowingly and were therefore valid.'
I. GUILTY PLEAS AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE STATE OF THE
LAW PRIOR TO BRADY AND PARKER.

It has long been established that a plea of guilty constitutes a
waiver of several fundamental constitutional rights' 5 and is therefore
subject to stringent safeguards.' 6 A constitutionally valid guilty plea
0390
9

U.S. 570 (1968).

ld. at 583.
10 It should be noted that the Court in Jackson was faced only with the question of the
constitutionality of the death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act. The
Court did not have before it a guilty plea tendered under that act because the defendant's
motion to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional
had been granted by the district court; no plea was ever entered. Thus, the assumption
by Brady and Parker that their guilty pleas were invalid for having been entered under
constitutionally infirm statutory schemes was pure speculation and was not directly
supported in Jackson.
1* While the North Carolina statute under which Parker had been convicted was not
directly affected by the decision in Jackson, the effect of the North Carolina statute was
the same; and Parker was safe in assuming that it would be invalidated under the
principle announced in Jackson. Indeed, the statute was invalidated on the basis of
Jackson in Alford v. North Carolina, 405 F.2d 340, 345 (4th Cir. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 39 U.S.L.W. 4001 (1970).
12
Brady v. United States, 404 F.2d 601 (10th Cir. 1968).
13Parker v. State, 2 N.C. App. 27, 162 S.E.2d 526 (1968).
14 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S.
790, 796 (1970).
15 See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969): Expressly the right against selfincrimination, trial by jury, and confrontation of witnesses.
'eSee Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S.
487 (1962); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948); Kercheval v. United States,
274 U.S. 220 (1927).
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must be knowingly and voluntarily tendered.17 Although often discussed under the single generic heading of "voluntariness," ' these two
requirements are separate and distinct elements, and an infirmity in
either serves to vitiate a particular guilty plea. 19
In order to constitute a "knowing" guilty plea, the defendant must
be fully apprised "of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses
included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder,
possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof,
and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole
matter ....
Implicit in such a test is the requirement that the information upon which the defendant relies must not be false or mis21
leading.
The requirement that a guilty plea be entered voluntarily is a more
illusive concept. From a philosophical point of view, the concept of
voluntariness connotes the free exercise of a person's will; but what
constitutes "free will" is open to alternative interpretations. On the
one hand, it is possible to proceed from the premise that the mere
existence of an extraneous inducement will be sufficient to deprive
an act of its voluntariness. Under this view, a guilty plea would be
involuntary unless motivated solely by the defendant's sense of guilt
and remorse. On the other hand, "free will" can be defined in terms
of a rational choice between genuine alternatives.23 With this interpretation, a guilty plea would be involuntary only when the impact of
extraneous inducements is sufficient to cause thfe defendant to make an
17 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S.
488, 493 (1962); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938); Kercheval v. United
States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
1sLassiter v. Turner, 423 F.2d 897, 900 (4th Cir. 1970).

19 McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1962).
2Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1948).
211d. at 720. See generally Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). Pursuant to such
reasoning it has been held that a prosecutor's threat to bring charges not permitted by
law or warranted by the evidence is tantamount to presenting a defendant with false and
misleading information and a guilty plea tendered in reliance thereon is invalid. Lassiter
v. Turner, 423 F.2d 897, 900 (4th Cir. 1970). Likewise where a prosecutor fails to keep
a promise of leniency upon which the defendant relied in tendering his plea, the plea
will not be allowed to stand. Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445, 449 (9th Cir. 1962).
This latter proposition probably has more to do with ethical due process than with the
"knowing" requirement, but it is possible to argue that the element of deceit implicit in
the broken promise is but another form of false and misleading information.
22 Fortunately for the administration of justice in the United States, the courts have not
embraced this argument; for roughly 90 percent of all convictions in the United States
result from guilty pleas (D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT
OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 8 (1966)), and most of these pleas are induced by
permissible plea bargaining. Thus if the premise that "free will" is negated by the existence of of any extraneous inducement were adopted by the courts, plea bargaining would
be inherently coercive, and the administration of justice in the United States would be
greatly impaired; but see Chalker, Judicial Myopia, Differential Sentencing and the
Guilty Plea - A ConstitutionalExamination, 6 AM. CRIM. L. Q. 187 (1968).
22 See Gilmore v. California, 364 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1966); Godlock v. Ross, 259 F. Supp.
659 (E.D.N.C. 1966); United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1963);
Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387 (1970).
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irrational choice.24 This second view would require coercion-in-fact to
render a guilty plea involuntary.
Judicial practice has drawn upon elements of both theories of
voluntariness. For example, courts are often heard to say that it is
necessary to look to all the relevant circumstances, i.e., the "totality of
factors," to determine whether or not the defendant was in fact
coerced.25 However, the inherent impropriety of a given inducement
may compel the conclusion that, irrespective of its actual impact on the
defendant's will, the mere presence of the inducement within his
decision making milieu is sufficient to render a guilty plea invalid. 6
In other words, such an inducement is deemed to be coercive per se.
This dual approach to the problem of voluntariness is illustrated
by the response of the lower courts to the decision in United States v.
Jackson. 7 Prior to Jackson, the mere fact that a defendant's decision
to plead guilty was motivated by his fear of the death penalty was
generally held to be insufficient to render his plea invalid." In the
aftermath of Jackson, however, the courts were faced with the problem
of deciding what effect an unconstitutional death penalty provision
should have on the validity of a guilty plea made in fear thereof. Given
the attitude of the courts toward improper inducements, 29 it might
have been expected that the courts would conclude that statutory
schemes such as that condemned in Jackson are inherently coercive
and that all guilty pleas tendered thereunder should be declared invalid.
However, inasmuch as express language in Jackson forbade such an
interpretation,o the courts were forced to adopt alternative positions.
From the quandary there emerged two distinct patterns.
The Fourth Circuit in the case of Alford v. North Carolina3 ' opted
for a "principal factor" test and held that a prisoner is entitled to relief
if he can demonstrate that his plea was primarily the product of the
24

Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. Rav. 1387, 1398 (1970).

2Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558
(1954); United States ex rel. Brock v. La Vallee, 306 F. Supp. 159, 165 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); McFarland v. United States, 284 F. Supp. 969, 977 (D. Md. 1968); United
States v. Colson, 230 F. Supp. 953, 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); United States v. Tateo, 214
F. Supp. 560, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
28 Euziere v. United States, 249 F.2d 293, 194-95 (10th Cir. 1957); United States v. Tateo,
214 F. Supp. 560, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) [Promises of leniency or threats of harsher
punishment by trial judge held to be coercive per se.]
27390 U.S. 570 (1968).
2 Gilmore v. California, 364 F.2d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 1966); Laboy v. New Jersey, 266 F.
Supp. 581, 584 (D.N.J. 1967).
2See
cases cited notes 21 & 26 supra.
30 According to the Court "the fact that the Federal Kidnapping Act tends to discourage
defendants from insisting upon their innocence and demanding trial by jury hardly
implies that every defendant who enters a guilty plea to a charge under the Act does so
involuntarily." 390 U.S. at 583.
31405 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1968), ret'd, 39 U.S.L.W. 4001 (1970).
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burdens placed upon him by the unconstitutional statutory scheme.3
According to the court in Alford, when fear of an unconstitutional
death penalty provision was the principal motivating factor in the
defendant's decision to plead guilty, there is no need for a subjective
inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea-the plea is invalid irrespective of whether or not the defendant was capable of making a
rational choice."3
Other federal courts have refused to assign any special status to
the constitutionally infirm death penalty and have continued to apply
the subjective "totality of factors" test 4 in an effort to determine
whether the defendant's will was actually overborne.3 5 This position
appears to be more in keeping with the underlying purpose of the
Jackson rationale which was not to identify inherently coercive inducements and render guilty pleas entered in response thereto invalid, but
rather to remove from the defendant's decisionmaking process inducements which needlessly penalize the assertion of constitutional rights."'
It is this position which is endorsed by the Supreme Court in the instant
cases.
II. BRADY AND PARKER: A CLARIFICATION

The Supreme Court's decision in the instant cases3 7 essentially
reaffirms the traditional "totality of factors" test and, at the same time,
redefines in more precise terms what constitutes an involuntary guilty
plea. 8 In arriving at its decision, the Court begins by reiterating what
it said in Jackson concerning the effect of statutory schemes, such as
those condemned, on a guilty plea made thereunder. According to the
Court in Brady: "Jackson ruled neither that all pleas of guilty encouraged by the fear of a possible death sentence are involuntary pleas nor
that such encouraged pleas are invalid whether involuntary or not.''89
Thus the Court rejects out of hand the assertion that unconstitutional
at 347. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's reaction to the test devised by the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, see text accompanying notes 47 & 48, infra.
33 Two district court cases which have applied the Alford test are Quillien v. Leeke, 303 F.
Supp. 698 (D.S.C. 1969); Shaw v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 824 (S.D. Ga. 1969).
4 See text accompanying note 25 supra.
3 United States ex rel. Brock v. La Vallee, 306 F. Supp. 159, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Pindell v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 751, 753 (D. Conn. 1969); Wilson v. United
States, 303 F. Supp. 1139, 1143 (W.D. Va. 1969); McFarland v. United States, 284 F.
Supp. 969, 977 (D. Md. 1968).
36390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968).
37 Since the Court's views on the issue under consideration are more complete in Brady
than in Parker, for purposes of analysis the Brady opinion will be used more extensively.
38
A third case, McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), decided on the same day
as Brady and Parker also sheds light on the question of when a guilty plea is valid and
when it is not; but inasmuch as it deals with the effect of an allegdly coerced confession
on the validity of a guilty plea, it is beyond the scope of this comment.
39397 U.S. 742, 747 (1970).
321d.
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death penalty provisions are inherently coercive. 40 In so doing, the
Court appears to be endorsing a concept of voluntariness which is based
entirely on the impact of the inducement in question on the defendant's
ability to make a rational choice. 4 ' In other words, the nature of the
inducement has no bearing on the question of voluntariness.4 2
In many respects the Court's holding in these two cases was inevitable. In Jackson the Court had invalidated a statutory scheme which
was said to encourage, as opposed to coerce, guilty pleas. Because the
infirmity was said to be a tendency to encourage, the Jackson decision
cast grave constitutional doubts on any and all inducements which are
calculated to encourage guilty pleas, including the time-honored practice of plea bargaining.4 s If an unconstitutional death penalty provision
and the practice of plea bargaining can be said to suffer from the same
infirmity, it is clear that if the Court had held that all guilty pleas made
in response to the encouragement offered by the unconstitutional statutory scheme are invalid, logic would compel the conclusion that guilty
pleas made in response to like encouragement offered by plea bargaining would be equally invalid.
Of course at first glance the Court could have avoided this undesirable result by holding that the statute condemned in Jackson was
infirm not only because it needlessly encouraged guilty pleas but also
because the encouragement involved was the threat of death - a threat
which, by its nature, is coercive. By emphasizing the gravity of the
threat, the Court could have resolved most of the doubts concerning
the constitutionality of plea bargaining without doing violence to its
holding in Jackson. It would then have been free to invalidate the guilty
pleas of Brady and Parker without the fear that its holding would be
cited as justification for invalidating guilty pleas made in response to
less offensive methods of encouragement. However, the Court would
40 As support for this proposition, the Court in Brady cites the case of Laboy v. New Jersey,
266 F. Supp. 581 (D.N.J. 1967), where a plea of non vult under a similar statute was
held voluntary even though the defendant was obsessed by the fear of death to the extent
of suffering a temporary breakdown. Id. at 747.
41 That this indeed represents the Court's view is illustrated by a revealing passage in the
text of the opinion. In rejecting Brady's contention that his plea was involuntary, the
Court notes that there was no evidence "that Brady was so gripped by fear of the death
penalty or hope of leniency that he did not or could not, with the help of counsel,
rationally weigh the advantages of going to trial against the advantage of pleading
guilty." 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970).
42Mr. Justice Brennan, in a separate opinion, attacks the Court's position in Brady and
Parker on the ground that it is "totally without precedent." 397 U.S. 790, 800 n.2
(1970). However, as has been previously noted, courts have often considered the impact
on the defendant's ability to make rational choices to be the controlling factor in the
issue of voluntariness. See cases cited in note 23 supra. Where the Court's position docs
differ from that of other courts is in its reluctance to hold that an improper or illicit
inducement is inherently coercive.
43 See Note, supra note 23 at 1387.
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still have been faced with the difficult task of showing how a statutory
threat of the death penalty differs in its coercive effect from the plea
bargaining situation in which the charges are reduced from first to
second degree murder in return for a plea of guilty. Both inducements
threaten the death penalty if the defendant goes to trial, and both offer
a promise of leniency if he does not. Again logic would compel that
if the death penalty provision is inherently coercive, so must be the
plea bargaining situation when the threat of the death penalty is
involved.
Thus no matter which way the court turned, a holding that a
guilty plea is invalid if made within the context of the statutory scheme
condemned in Jackson would have provided serious grounds for attacking other guilty pleas entered in response to a threat of greater punishment or an offer of leniency. The response of the Court to this dilemma
was to revert to the "totality of factors" test 44 and to determine the
question of voluntariness on the record.
III.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF BRADY AND PARKER

The Court's clear emphasis on the impact (as opposed to the nature) of inducements on the rationality of choice in determining voluntariness is not likely to produce any appreciable change in the prevailing judicial approach to the question of validity of guilty pleas. If the
holding is given broad interpretation, it may be that the inherent coerciveness of threats or promises by judges4 5 will no longer be recognized,
making it necessary to look to the impact of such inducements on the
defendant's will to determine whether his ability to make a rational
choice was actually overborne. On the other hand, because of the unequal bargaining power of the judge and defendant and because of
the need to ensure impartiality, it may be that this apparent exception
to the holding in the instant cases will be preserved.
As to unkept promises or threats by prosecutors, the requirement
that the defendant be aware of all relevant circumstances, including
the range of possible penalties, will serve to ensure that a guilty plea
induced by deceit, whether intentional or unintentional, will not be
4
sustained. "
44"The voluntariness of Brady's plea can be determined only by considering all of the

relevant circumstances surrounding it." 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970).
45 See cases cited note 26 supra.
46 Courts often hold that such promises or threats are coercive per se, but in fact the decep-

tion problem speaks to the knowledge requirement and not to the voluntariness requirement. Thus while deception will still have the effect of vitiating a guilty plea made in
response thereto, courts will have to frame the infirmity in more precise terms.
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CONCLUSION

In striking down the death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act in United States v. Jackson, the Supreme Court clearly
manifested its disapproval of statutory schemes - and, by implication,
of all official acts- which needlessly encourage the waiver of constitutional rights. What was not directly before the Court in Jackson,
however, was the question of the validity of guilty pleas induced by
such schemes. While it may have been logical to assume prior to Brady
and Parker that had the Jackson Court been confronted with this question it would have opted for invalidity, the decisions in those cases
expressly reject such a conclusion. Indeed, the decisions in Brady and
Parker do not in any way affect the continued viability of Jackson. In
Brady and Parker the Court merely answers the question left open in
Jackson regarding the validity of guilty pleas tendered within the context of a constitutionally infirm statutory scheme.
By deciding the validity issue in Brady and Parker in terms of the
"totality of factors" test, the Court has to a considerable extent clarified
the concept of voluntariness: Only when an extraneous inducement,
whether proper or improper, has the effect of rendering a defendant
incapable of exercising rational choice will a guilty plea fail for involuntariness. This differs considerably from the "primary factor" test
expounded by the Fourth Circuit in Alford v. North Carolina47 and
4
endorsed by the concurring and dissenting justices in the instant cases. 1
The primary difference between the two positions is one of emphasis.
While both pay homage to some sort of "factors" test, the tack taken
in Alford was to give conclusive weight to illicit inducements. Thus
the emphasis there was on the nature of the inducement while the
emphasis in the instant cases is on the impact of the inducement.
The Supreme Court recently had occasion to review the decision
in Alford, and in so doing it expressly rejected the reasoning of the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 49 Relying on its decision in
Brady, the Court held that the standard for determining the validity
of guilty pleas "remains, [sic] whether the plea represents a voluntary
and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the
defendant.... That he would not have pleaded except for the opportunity to limit the possible penalty does not necessarily demonstrate
that the plea of guilty was not the product of a free and rational choice
47405 F.2d 340, 347 (4th Cir. 1968), rev'd 39 U.S.L.W. 4001 (1970).

397 U.S. 790, 808 (1970) wherein Mr. Justice Brennan stated: "If a particular defendant
can demonstrate that the death penalty scheme exercised a significant influence upon his
decision to plead guilty, then, under Jackson, he is entitled to reversal of the conviction
based upon his illicitly produced plea."
4North Carolina v. Alford, 39 U.S.L.W. 4001, 4002 (1970).
48
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-50 Thus, the Supreme Court in Alford clearly reaffirmed the prin-

ciples announced in Brady and Parker and left little doubt as to what
constitutes the proper test for determining the validity of guilty pleas.
Despite its clarity of statement, the test endorsed by the Court in
Brady and Parker is limited by the obvious difficulty of quantifying
the impact of the various inducements so as to be able to ascertain
whether or not a particular defendant was rendered incapable of rational choice. Perhaps as the lower courts begin to apply the test, the
mechanics of application will come into more precise focus.5 '

3MId. at 4002. It should be noted that a factual variation in Alford raised an additional
issue apart from the question of the voluntariness of Alford's plea. It seems that after
his guilty plea had been tendered but before it had been accepted, Alford denied he
had committed the murder for which he had been charged. Nevertheless he reaffirmed
his desire to plead guilty in order to avoid a possible death sentence. In spite of Alford's
protestations of innocence, the trial court, after considering the strength of the State's
case, accepted his plea and sentenced him to 30 years imprisonment. Thus, on review the
Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether a guilty plea can be accepted when
it is accompanied by protestations of innocence and hence contains only a waiver of trial
but no admission of guilt. In deciding this issue, the Court referred to language in Brady
which in that context unequivocally stated that admission of guilt by the defendant is
"[clentral to the plea and is the foundation for entering judgment .... " 397 U.S. 742,
748. In an obvious attempt to get around what would otherwise be troublesome language,
the Court in Alford qualifies the statement in Brady by stating that admission of guilt
is normall central to the plea. 39 U.S.L.W. 4001, 4003 (1970). Having surmounted
this obstacle, the Court then proceeds to hold that "while most pleas of guilty consist of
both a waiver of trial and an express admission of guilt, the latter element is not a
constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal penalty." Id. at 4004. Furthermoxe,
a trial judge who accepts a plea which is accompanied by protestations of innocence does
not commit constitutional error so long as he has reason to believe that there is a factual
basis for the plea. Id.
' It should be noted that two recent cases decided by the Supreme Court ameliorate to some
extent the magnitude of this problem. In AMcCarth) v. United States, 394 U.S. 459
(1969), the Court held that the trial court, before acepting a guilty plea, must comply
with the provisions of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and satisfy itself
as to the voluntariness, intelligence, and factual basis of the plea. Id. at 467. Where
this requirement is met the appellate courts will not disturb the judgment of the trial
court unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. Id. at 470. In Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238 (1969), this requirement was extended to state courts. Id. at 243. Thus at
least as to guilty pleas made after McCarthy and Boykin the appellate courts will seldom
have to undertake the task of ascertaining from the record the impact of any particular
inducement on the defendant's freedom of choice.

